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It is common to distinguish moral rules, reasons, or values that are agent-relative
fromthose thatareagent-neutral.Onecanalsodistinguishmoral rules, reasons, or
values that are moment-relative from those that are moment-neutral. In this ar-
ticle, I introduce a third distinction that stands alongside these two distinctions—
the distinction between moral rules, reasons, or values that are patient-relative
and those that are patient-neutral. I then show how patient-relativity plays an im-
portant role in several moral theories, gives us a better understanding of agent-
relativity and moment-relativity, and provides a novel objection to Derek Parﬁt’s
“appeal to full relativity” argument.
INTRODUCTION
The distinction between an agent-relative reason, rule, or value, and an
agent-neutral reason, rule, or value is widely recognized as one of the
most important distinctions in value theory. A second related distinction
is that between a moment-relative reason, rule, or value and a moment-
neutral reason, rule, or value. Although this distinction is not as prom-
inent in value theory as the agent-neutral/relative distinction, it is also
important and has been discussed by several philosophers. In this article,
I introduce a third distinction that stands alongside these two distinc-
tions—the distinction between a patient-relative reason, rule, or value and
a patient-neutral reason, rule, or value. This distinction is based on the ob-
servation that the numerical identity of a moral patient may be a morally
* I would like to thank Daniel Nolan and Nic Southwood for invaluable advice on this
article. I am also very thankful for helpful comments from Ryan Cox, Philip Pettit, Doug
Portmore, Daniel Stoljar, and Kalpana Vignehsa, as well as two anonymous referees and the
associate editors of this journal.
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signiﬁcant factor. In some contexts the moral signiﬁcance of patient iden-
tity has already been noted. However, a sustained and systematic account
of this phenomenon has not been provided. I offer such an account in this
article. Furthermore, I show how this account leads to a distinction be-
tween patient-relativity and patient-neutrality. Recognizing the possibility
of patient-relativity is important because it plays a key role in several moral
theories, gives us a better understanding of agent-relativity and moment-
relativity, and provides a novel objection to Derek Parﬁt’s “appeal to full
relativity” argument.
Here is how the rest of this article will proceed. In Section I, I will
explain the agent-neutral/agent-relative distinction, and in Section II I
will explain the moment-neutral/moment-relative distinction. This pro-
vides a helpful background for the discussion that follows in Section III. In
part A of Section III, I introduce the patient-relative/patient-neutral dis-
tinction by presenting several cases where a patient’s numerical identity
appears to make a difference to our moral obligations. I follow this in part
B with a discussion of the logical structure of patient-relativity and its re-
lation to agent-relativity andmoment-relativity. Finally in part C I show how
several moral theories may be committed to patient-relative rules. I then
show how the possibility of patient-relativity provides a response to Derek
Parﬁt’s “appeal to full relativity” argument.
I. AGENT-RELATIVITY AND AGENT-NEUTRALITY
The agent-neutral/agent-relative distinctionwas brought to the attention
of contemporary philosophers by Thomas Nagel’s discussion of it in The
Possibility of Altruism, although it was not until Parﬁt’s Reasons and Persons
that the distinction came to be described using the terminology “agent-
neutral” and “agent-relative.”1 Since Nagel’s initial discussion, many dif-
ferent accounts of the distinction have been put forward.2 Debates about
how to formulate the distinction are complicated by the fact that it can be
applied to three different categories—reasons, rules, and values. Which of
these categories, if any, should take priority in explicating the distinction
is often disputed. Importantly, the participants in these debates agree that
they are talking about the same distinction and give roughly the same as-
sessment of various cases as agent-neutral or agent-relative. What they dis-
agree about is the optimal way of cashing the distinction out.
1. Thomas Nagel, The Possibility of Altruism (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,
1970); Derek Parﬁt, Reasons and Persons (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984).
2. For detailed discussion of the many ways of formulating the distinction, see Michael
Ridge, “Reasons for Action: Agent-Neutral vs. Agent-Relative,” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta (Winter 2011 ed.), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win
2011/entries/reasons-agent/; and Douglas Portmore, “Agent-Relative vs. Agent-Neutral,” in
International Encyclopedia of Ethics, ed. Hugh LaFollette (London: Wiley Blackwell, 2014).
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Which of the many formulations of the distinction is best is not a
question I will address in this article. However, I will review two popular
accounts of the distinction as it applies to moral rules as a set-up to the
discussion that follows. It should be noted that in choosing formulations
that apply to moral rules I am not taking a stand on whether rules have
priority over reasons or values. In this article, every claim I make about
the neutrality or relativity of moral rules can be translated into a claim
about the neutrality or relativity of reasons or values.
According to Derek Parﬁt, an agent-relative rule is a rule that gives
different agents different aims, whereas an agent-neutral rule is a rule
that gives all agents the same aim.3 As an example, consider a moral rule
that prohibits the killing of innocent people which I will call “DK,” short
for “Do not kill”:
DK: Each agent must not kill innocent people.
DK is an agent-relative rule because it gives each agent a different aim—
the aim that he or she does not kill. Thus, DK gives Alfred the aim that
“Alfred does not kill” and Sita the aim that “Sita does not kill.” DK can
be usefully contrasted with a rule that instructs us to minimize the kill-
ing of innocent people. Let’s call this rule “MK,” short for “minimize
killing”:
MK: Each agent must minimize the killing of innocent people.
MK is agent-neutral because it gives each agent the same aim. Alfred’s
aim is that there is as little overall killing as possible, and Sita’s aim is the
same.4 This contrast is most vivid in cases where, by killing an innocent
3. Parﬁt, Reasons and Persons, 27, 129.
4. Two clariﬁcations are necessary here. First, when Parﬁt talks of agents having the
same aim, he is referring to “ultimate aims” and not “derived aims.” If Alfred and Sita are in
different circumstances, then they might ﬁnd that minimizing killing requires them each
to do different things. As such, MK gives them different aims. However, these different aims
are derived from the same ultimate aim that they each share—the aim of minimizing kill-
ing. Second, onemight interpret MK as giving different agents different ultimate aims. Per-
haps it gives Alfred the ultimate aim that “Alfred minimizes killing” and Sita the ultimate
aim that “Sitaminimizes killing.” However, as DavidMcNaughton and Piers Rawling, “Agent-
Relativity and the Doing-Happening Distinction,” Philosophical Studies, 63 (1991): 167–85
note, the distinction can still be made even if such an interpretation of MK is legitimate. For,
although this interpretation counts MK as giving different agents different ultimate aims,
there is also an equally valid interpretation of MK where it gives different agents the same
aim (i.e., the aim of minimizing killing). However, there is no plausible interpretation of DK
where different agents have the same ultimate aim. Thus, Parﬁt’s account of the distinction
is best stated as follows: A rule is agent-neutral if and only if there is a valid interpretation of
it that gives all agents the same ultimate aim, and is agent-relative otherwise.
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person, an agent can prevent more killings by others. Suppose the Maﬁa
make a credible threat to Alfred that if he does not kill a random inno-
cent person they will kill several innocent people. What should Alfred
do? According to DK, Alfred must not kill the innocent person even
though that will mean there is more killing overall. This is because DK
gives Alfred a special concern with his own killing, requiring him to give
it priority over the killings that others might commit. According to MK,
Alfred must kill the innocent person. For, in this situation, doing so will
result in fewer killings overall and MK requires Alfred to give equal con-
sideration to any killings that may occur whether or not he is responsible
for them.
Parﬁt’s intuitive account of the distinction can be contrasted with the
more formal account of David McNaughton and Piers Rawling. Accord-
ing to McNaughton and Rawling, moral rules like DK and MK have an
underlying logical form that is not immediately apparent.5 For example,
they interpret DK as having the following underlying structure:
(1) (x)(x should ensure [(x does not kill)]).
Whereas MK has this structure:
(2) (x)(x should ensure [(y)(y does not kill)]).
McNaughton and Rawling argue that (1) is agent-relative because the con-
tent of the rule (the sentence in the square brackets) makes reference to
a speciﬁc agent. By contrast, (2) is agent-neutral because the content of
the rule does not refer to any speciﬁc agent. More formally, they say that
a rule expressed with the form (x)(x should ensure [. . .]) “is agent-
relative if and only if there is an occurrence of x in the square brackets
bound by the initial universal quantiﬁer; it is agent-neutral otherwise.”6
Whatever account of the agent-neutral/agent-relative distinction
one accepts, there appears to be widespread agreement on its impor-
tance. Thomas Hurka describes it as one of “the greatest contributions
of recent ethics.”7 Several others have claimed that it gives a precise and
illuminating account of the distinction between consequentialism and
nonconsequentialism.8 Finally, James Dreier has argued that it is distinct
5. McNaughton and Rawling, “Agent-Relativity and the Doing-Happening Distinction.”
6. David McNaughton and Piers Rawling, “Honoring and Promoting Values,” Ethics
102 (1992): 835–43, 837.
7. Thomas Hurka, “Moore in the Middle,” Ethics 113 (2003): 599–628, 628.
8. For example, see McNaughton and Rawling, “Honoring and Promoting Values”; and
Philip Pettit, “The Consequentialist Perspective,” in Three Methods of Ethics, by Marcia Baron,
Philip Pettit, and Michael Slote (Oxford: Blackwell, 1997).
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from, yet more fundamental to moral theory than the distinction between
consequentialism and nonconsequentialism.9
II. MOMENT-RELATIVITY AND MOMENT-NEUTRALITY
The next distinction goes by many different names. John Broome uses
the terms “moment-neutral” and “moment-relative” to mark it. Michael
Ridge employs the terms “diachronic” and “synchronic.” Jennie Louise
prefers the terms “temporal-neutral” and “temporal-relative.” Finally, Fran-
cis Kamm describes this kind of relativity as the “agent-centered and time-
slice approach to persons” and “deontology of the presentmoment.”10 I will
use Broome’s terminology of “moment-neutral” and “moment-relative,” al-
thoughnothing important hangs on the terminology used. The best way to
see this distinction clearly is to consider an alternative version of the Maﬁa
case described above. Suppose that Alfred is not in a situation where the
Maﬁa will kill several if he fails to kill one. Instead, he is in a situation where
it is his own future self who will kill several if his current self fails to kill one.
Perhaps Alfred ﬁnds his mind slowly being overtaken by homicidal desires
and correctly judges that, unless he kills one now, his weak will andmorally
corrupted desires will soon lead him to kill several. According to the agent-
relative rule DK, Alfred must not kill innocent people. However, in this
scenariowherehehas to choose betweenkillingonenowandkilling several
later what should he do?One possiblemoral rule (let’s call it DK0) requires
him to give equal consideration to all of his potential killings and prevent
asmanyof themaspossible. This would requireAlfred tokill theonenow to
prevent his later killing of several. Such a rule ismoment-neutral because it
does not give priority to any particularmoment in time such as the present.
An alternative moral rule (let’s call it DK00) requires Alfred to give special
priority to any killing he is about to perform, and thus to not kill the one
now. Such a rule is moment-relative because it gives special priority to the
present moment. We can also state the difference between these two rules
using Parﬁt’s talk of “aims” (although Parﬁt himself never does this). DK0 is
moment-neutral because it gives different time slices of the same agent the
same aim (the aim that the agent kills as little as possible). DK00 is moment-
9. See James Dreier, “The Structure of Normative Theories,”Monist 76 (1993): 22–40,
39.
10. John Broome,Weighing Goods (New York: Blackwell, 1991); Michael Ridge, “Agent-
Neutral Consequentialism from the Inside-Out: Concern for Integrity without Self In-
dulgence,” Utilitas 13 (2001): 236–54; Jennie Louise, “Relativity of Value and the Con-
sequentialist Umbrella,” Philosophical Quarterly 54 (2004): 518–36; Francis Kamm, “Review:
Non-consequentialism, the Person as an End-in-Itself, and the Signiﬁcance of Status,” Phi-
losophy and Public Affairs 21 (1992): 354–89.
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relative because it gives different time slices of the same agent different
aims (the aim that the time slice does not kill at the moment it inhabits).
In the example described above the moment-relative rule was also
an agent-relative rule (the rule both gives different agents different
aims, and different time slices of the same agent different aims). How-
ever, moment-relative rules can also be agent-neutral. For example, John
Broome describes a possible moral rule that appears to be agent-neutral
yet moment-relative.11 According to this rule when a miner is trapped in a
mine everyone is required to perform actions (e.g., contributing resources
to the rescue effort) that will maximize the miner’s chance of being saved.
Stated thus the rule appears agent-neutral (it gives all agents the same
aim). However, Broome’s rule also has a caveat requiring agents to per-
form any action which contributes to saving miners who are currently
trapped, even if doing so will mean thatmore trappedminers in the future
will go unsaved. Thus, we must not hold resources back from current ef-
forts even if doing so would allow more miners to be saved in the future.
This caveat does not alter the rule’s agent-neutral status (everyone has the
same aim at any one time) but does appear to make the rule moment-
relative (our different time slices are given different aims).
So it appears that the moment-neutral/moment-relative distinction
is logically independent of the agent-neutral/agent-relative distinction.
There are four possible ways that these two distinctions can combine.12
First, a rule might be both agent-neutral and moment-neutral (e.g., the
“maximize total net pleasure” rule of classical utilitarianism). Second, a
rule might be both agent-relative and moment-relative (e.g., the tradi-
tional deontological constraint on killing). Third, a rule might be agent-
neutral but moment-relative (e.g., the rule speciﬁed in Broome’s miner
example). Fourth, a rulemight be agent-relative yetmoment-neutral (e.g.,
a rule that normally prohibits killing to prevent more killing but permits it
when current and future killers are the same agent).
Although the moment-neutral/moment-relative distinction has not
received as much attention as the agent-neutral/agent-relative distinc-
tion, it is nonetheless an important distinction in value theory. For exam-
ple, Francis Kamm uses moment-relativity to argue that deontological con-
straints are best explained by the inviolability of victims. Douglas Portmore
uses it to argue that agent-relative consequentialism does better than its
deontological rivals. Finally, John Broome argues that moment-relativity
is more important than agent-relativity when it comes to understanding
deontological side-constraints.13
11. Broome, Weighing Goods, 8.
12. See Louise, “Relativity of Value,” 535.
13. See Kamm, “Non-consequentialism”; Douglas Portmore, Commonsense Consequential-
ism (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 103–8; and Broome,Weighing Goods, 9.
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III. PATIENT-RELATIVITY AND PATIENT-NEUTRALITY
The two distinctions I discuss in Sections I and II are logically indepen-
dent and yet appear to be closely related. Both distinctions are recog-
nized by value theorists and applied to important debates in value theory.
However, there is a third distinction that appears to belong to this fam-
ily of distinctions and yet has so far gone unrecognized. I will label this
distinction the “patient-neutrality/patient-relativity distinction.” The idea
behind this distinction is simple. The existence of agent-relative moral the-
ories shows us that the numerical identity of the agent acting might make
a difference to the deontic status of the act. The existence of moment-
relative moral theories shows us that the numerical identity of the time
slice acting might make a difference to the deontic status of the act. A third
factor that can be variable in such cases is the identity of amoral patient. In
many scenarios when an agent faces a morally signiﬁcant choice there is a
moral patient who is affected in some way by the choice the agent makes.
Perhaps, just as the numerical identity of the agent or the time slice can
make a difference, the numerical identity of the moral patient can make a
difference. When patient identity makes a difference to the deontic status
of an act then we have a case of patient-relativity. When it makes no differ-
ence we have patient-neutrality.
This is a reasonable ﬁrst attempt at explaining patient-relativity. How-
ever, much more needs to be said to explain this distinction and demon-
strate its importance to moral theory. I will begin this task in part A below
by presenting a case which, according to our commonsense moral judg-
ments, appears to be an instance of patient-relativity. In part B, I will offer
a precise account of the patient-relative/patient-neutral distinction. I will
also look at different ways that patient-relativity can combine with agent-
relativity and moment-relativity. Finally, in part C, I will show some useful
applications in moral theory for patient-relativity.
A. An Initial Case of Patient-Relativity
Some moral theories endorse an agent-relative rule prohibiting promise
breaking. Such a rule requires agents not to break a promise even if do-
ing so is the only way to prevent more promise breaking by others. How-
ever, for any theory that endorses such a rule there is a further question we
can ask. Should the rule be interpreted as moment-neutral or moment-
relative? To answer this we ask whether an agent is permitted to break a
promise now if that is the only way she can ensure that she keeps several
equally weighty promises in the future. For example, suppose Alfred has
made a promise to his colleague Marvin to send a report to Marvin by
tonight. However, he has also made ﬁve separate promises to ﬁve other
colleagues that require him to complete various tasks by tomorrow (which
are each as important as sending Marvin the report). Alfred has failed to
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make a start on any of these tasks and realizes that, unless he works on
these tasks now, thereby breaking the promise to Marvin, he will break all
ﬁve of tomorrow’s promises. Thus he must choose between keeping his
promise to Marvin now and breaking promises to ﬁve other colleagues
tomorrow, or breaking his promise to Marvin now and keeping his prom-
ises to ﬁve others tomorrow. In these kinds of cases I suspect that some
who endorse the agent-relative rule prohibiting promise breaking will
favor a moment-neutral interpretation while others will favor a moment-
relative interpretation. Those who favor moment-neutrality might reason as
follows:
Those who make incompatible promises have done wrong and owe
compensation to any promisee who fails to get her due. However, in
deciding which promises to keep and which to sacriﬁce, it is best that
the agentminimizes her overall promise breakingbecause, other things
being equal, it is better that a lesser number rather than a greater num-
ber are wronged by the bad faith of promise breaking. Furthermore,
temporal order does not seem to be a morally signiﬁcant factor. Why
should the fact that the promise made to you will be fulﬁlled before
the promise made to me mean that the fulﬁlment of your promise
counts formore than the fulﬁlment ofmine? But, if temporal order is
notmorally signiﬁcant, then it ismorallyunjustiﬁed to favorkeeping the
promise that will be broken ﬁrst simply because of its temporal order.
By contrast, those who favor the moment-relative account may reason as
follows:
The person who makes incompatible promises still has an obliga-
tion, at each moment, to keep any promise that it is in her power to
keep. To fail to do so for the gain of more personal promise keeping
overall is to use one of the promisees and the commitment she is
owed as a means to the end of fulﬁlling other promises, and this
is morally objectionable. Furthermore, my moment-neutral rival is
already committed, via her agent-relativity, to the claim that maxi-
mizing general promise keeping is not a good enough reason for
breaking a promise. But if she is committed to this then how can she
say that maximizing personal promise keeping justiﬁes breaking
a promise? To think that the general case does not count but the
personal case does is to be overly partial to oneself, and such par-
tiality is morally objectionable.
Perhaps many will ﬁnd the moment-relative account the more convinc-
ing of the two in this debate. However, consider a variation of the case
where the one proximate promise and the ﬁve equally weighty future
promises all have the same promisee (i.e., the same moral patient). For
example, perhaps Alfred’s one promise due tonight and ﬁve promises
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due tomorrow are all promises he made to Marvin. Does the promisee
being the same person rather than different people change things?Many
will be inclined to say that it does. For, it is one thing to say that I must
not break a promise to you now in order to keep (equally weighty) future
promises I have made to ﬁve others. It is another thing to say that I must
not break a promise to you now if that is the only means available to me
to keep ﬁve (equally weighty) future promises I also made to you. In the
former case you will be worse off if I break my promise. However, in the
latter case you will be better off overall. For, from your perspective as
the promisee, ﬁve promises kept and one broken is preferable to one
kept and ﬁve broken (assuming that all promises are equally weighty).
Furthermore, in the former case you might reasonably claim that you
have been treated unfairly by having the promise owed to you neglected
so that others can gain some advantage. However, in the latter case such
claims of unfairness fail because the promise owed to you now is being
neglected not to advantage others at your expense, but rather to your
advantage. On these grounds, many who endorse the moment-relative
interpretation of the constraint on promise breaking will agree that the
constraint is best given a moment-neutral interpretation when we are
making a trade-off between present and future promise breaking involv-
ing the same patient. Thus, in this case it appears that the identity of the
moral patient makes a difference to moral requirements. When the pa-
tients involved in a trade-off are numerically identical then the constraint
is moment-neutral. However, when the patients are not numerically iden-
tical then the constraint is moment-relative.
The example above involves promising. However, other moral du-
ties also appear to have this patient-relative structure. For example, con-
sider the special duties we owe to friends. Such duties are agent-relative
because they require us not to neglect our friends even if doing so will
cause less neglecting of friends by others. They also appear moment-
relative because they require us not to neglect a friend now even if doing
so will result in our neglecting other friends less in the long run. How-
ever, what about a case where the short-term and long-term trade-offs
involve the same friend? Suppose that Sita has the options of either giv-
ing support to her friend Ruth now or withholding support at this mo-
ment. However, Sita learns that if she gives her support now then this will
make her unable to give her support on many future occasions (perhaps
giving support at this moment will lead to a deep resentment which will
make it hard for her to support Ruth in the future). On the other hand, if
Sita withholds support now she will be able to offer more support to Ruth
in the future and will end up being a better friend in the long run. Many
will think that, although duties of friendship are generally moment-
relative, in cases like this where short-term and long-term trade-offs involve
the same friendship (i.e., the samemoral patient), the moment-relative con-
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straint no longer applies. Thus, duties of friendship appear plausible candi-
dates for patient-relativity.
The examples considered so far (promissory duties and duties of
friendship) are both special duties. However, some natural duties are
also candidates for patient-relativity. For example, consider a natural duty
prohibiting stealing. Such a duty appears agent-relative because it re-
quires each agent not to commit an act of theft even when doing so is the
only way to prevent several comparable thefts being committed by others.
Furthermore, many will hold that this duty is generally moment-relative
because we must not steal from one person at the present moment even
if doing so is the only way to prevent our future selves from stealing from
several others. However, consider a case where the current and future
thefts are to be committed against the same person. It is not easy to con-
struct a plausible version of such a case, but here is an attempt. Suppose
that Rudi has set up a scam to steal one hundred dollars from Suki’s
bank account on ﬁve separate occasions over the next month. The scam is
difﬁcult to undo and the only way for Rudi to prevent it from going ahead
is by stealing one hundred dollars from Suki’s account now (perhaps do-
ing so will set off a warning system that will prevent the future thefts). In
such a case many will claim that the agent should steal from the patient
now to prevent several comparable thefts against that same patient in the
future. However, they will insist that the agent must not steal from one
patient now in order to prevent several comparable thefts against differ-
ent patients in the future. Thus, duties not to steal property are another
candidate for patient-relativity.14
At this point it is worth clarifying what these initial examples of
patient-relativity are intended to show. I am not arguing that any of the
patient-relative rules considered above are in fact true. I ammerely point-
ing to the possibility of such rules to highlight patient-relativity as a pos-
sible feature that a moral theory can possess. Many will ﬁnd patient-
relative rules of the kind described above intuitively plausible and even
compelling. However, others will reject them. Agent-neutral consequen-
tialists will reject them because they reject all agent-relative constraints.
Others will reject them because they prefer the moment-neutral inter-
pretation of such constraints (even when the trade-off is between differ-
ent patients). Finally, someone who endorses the moment-relative inter-
pretation of such a constraint might insist that this interpretation holds
even in same-patient cases. For example, it might be claimed that it is
14. Reﬂection on these examples raises an interesting question about whether there
is a general principle that predicts patient-relativity (I thank an anonymous referee for sug-
gesting this possibility). I will not propose such a principle in this article.However, in partC I
will show how some moral theories are committed to patient-relativity, and this discussion
will illuminate several directions we might take in formulating a general principle.
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wrong to break a promise to one patient in the present moment, even if
doing so is the only way to prevent a greater amount of future prom-
ise breaking to that same patient. For perhaps doing so is to disrespect
the institution of promising and this is wrong regardless of whether it is
harmful or unfair to any particular individual. It is not my concern here
to offer replies to each of these critics. However, partC will indirectly ad-
dress the issue of whether we should endorse any patient-relative moral
rules by showing how some normative theories might entail, or provide
strong support for, patient-relativity.
B. The Logical Structure of Patient-Relativity
The cases we considered above give us an initial picture of what a patient-
relativemoral rulemight look like.However,more work needs to be done
to get a clearer picture of the nature and scope of patient-relativity. In
the cases we have already considered, the identity of the patient acted as
a switch that turns on and off the moment-relative requirement. When
the proximate patient was also the future patient affected by the action,
then moment-relativity was turned off. When the proximate patient was
distinct from any future patients, then moment-relativity was turned on.
However, the same process may also occur in relation to agent-relativity.
To see how consider the following example. Suppose that if I break a
promise to you I will prevent several promises made by other agents to
other patients from being broken. The agent-relative rule will prohibit
promise breaking in such circumstances. However, let’s modify the ex-
ample and suppose that the promisesmade by other agents are also prom-
ises made to you. I have the options of either keeping my promise to you
or breaking it. I know that ﬁve (equally weighty) promises made to you by
others will only be kept if I break my promise. What should I do? An ob-
vious answer is that Imight ask you to cancelmy promise (a power that you
have as the promisee) so that you can beneﬁt from your future promises
beinghonored.However, suppose that this is not possible (perhaps you are
unaware of the situation and I am unable to inform you).What should the
agent do in such a circumstance? One possible answer is that the agent
ought to break the promise because this will make the promisee better off
overall. This answer involves a form of patient-relativity. However, some
may have reservations about this answer. For, unlike the initial case where
the agent was minimizing her own promise breaking, this case requires an
agent to get her hands dirty by breaking a commitment that she otherwise
would have kept, thereby committing a prima facie wrong. It might be ar-
gued that this is an unfair burden to place on the agent.15 Nonetheless,
15. This complaint may have evenmore intuitive force in the friendship example. For,
unlike the good of promise keeping, the good of friendship may be equally good for both
the patient and the agent and thus a duty to sacriﬁce friendship for the greater good of the
friend may be an unfair burden on the agent.
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somemoral theoriesmay endorse this kind of patient-relativity. Therefore,
although patient-relativitymay lookmost plausible in the case where it acts
as a switch on moment-relativity, it could also act as a switch on agent-
relativity, cancelling the agent-relative constraint when the trade-off in-
volves the same patient.
This raises the question of howpatient-relativity is related to the other
distinctions we have discussed. In Section II, we saw that agent-relativity and
moment-relativity are logically independent of one another and thus there
are no limits on how agent-neutrality/relativity and moment-neutrality/
relativity might be combined in amoral theory. Is the same true of patient-
relativity? The talk above of its being a switch that turns on and off other
kinds of relativity suggests that patient-relativity lacks logical indepen-
dence. However, the switch metaphor is a little misleading here. For each
of the cases we have considered so far involve not one patient-relative rule
but rather two rules. For example, consider the initial promise-breaking
example. One interpretation of the agent-relative constraint on breaking
promises is moment-neutral. According to this interpretation the con-
straint on breaking promises requires agents to never break a promise unless
doing so will lead to her breaking fewer promises overall. Such a rule can be
succinctly stated as follows:
(3) Each agent must minimize her own promise breaking.
Another interpretation of the agent-relative constraint on promise break-
ing is moment-relative. According to this interpretation the constraint on
breaking promises requires agents to never break a promise in the pres-
ent evenwhen doing so will lead to less future promise breaking. This rule
can be stated as follows:
(4) Each agent, at each moment, must not break a promise.16
Finally, the patient-relative option requires agents to follow (3) in same-
patient cases and follow (4) in different-patient cases. I submit that such
a theory is best represented as containing two distinct rules:
(5) Each agent must minimize her own promise breaking to
the same patient.
16. You might worry that this statement does not adequately capture the moment-
relative rule as it does not give guidance on what to do in situations where one will either
break one promise now, or break several promises later, whereas a moment-relative rule
properly conceived should instruct agents to favor present promise keeping. If you have
this worry then the following may better capture the moment-relative rule: (4
0
) Each agent,
at each moment, must minimize her promise breaking at that moment.
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(6)Eachagent, at eachmoment,must not break apromise to one
patient to bring about less promise breaking to other patients.
Rules (5) and (6) are each patient-relative because each rule makes ref-
erence to the numerical identity of moral patients. Rules (3) and (4) are
patient-neutral because each rule makes no reference to the numerical
identity of moral patients. Thus, we can say that a moral rule is patient-
relative if and only if, when the rule is fully stated, it contains an in-
eliminable reference to the numerical identity of a moral patient, and is
otherwise patient-neutral.
This intuitive account of the difference between a patient-neutral
and a patient-relative rule can be adapted to the more formal approach
employed byMcNaughton and Rawling that wasmentioned above in Sec-
tion I. According to their approach a rule expressed with the form (x)(x
should ensure [. . .]) is agent-relative just in case there is an ineliminable
occurrence of x in the square brackets that is bound by the initial univer-
sal quantiﬁer. This approach can be adapted to moment-relativity by in-
troducing a time variable “t.” Thus, a rule expressed with the form (x)(t)(x
should ensure at t [. . .]) is moment-relative just in case there is an in-
eliminable occurrence of t in the square brackets that is bound by the ini-
tial temporal universal quantiﬁer. Finally, we can say that a rule expressed
with the form (x)(x should ensure [. . .]) is patient-relative just in case
there is an ineliminable occurrence of an identity operator in the square
brackets (i.e., the operators “5” and “≠”). For example, we might translate
(6) above into McNaughton and Rawling’s canonical form as follows:
(60)(x)(t)(x should ensure at t [(y)(z)(If y ≠ z then it is not the case
that x breaks a promise to y at t in order to keep more promises
overall to z)]).
Notice that (60) contains an ineliminable occurrence of an identity op-
erator in the square brackets. Thus, according to the account of patient-
relativity adapted to the McNaughton and Rawling approach, (6
0
) is cor-
rectly categorized as patient-relative.
Although it seemsnatural for amoral theory to combine rule (5)with
rule (6), these two rules are logically independent as there is nothing con-
tradictory in amoral theory containing one of these rules without contain-
ing the other. More generally, a moral theory can contain a rule proscrib-
ing an action in same-patient cases and yet contain no rule pertaining to
what is permitted or prohibited in the corresponding different-patient
cases (and vice versa). However, it seems reasonable to conjecture that any
plausible moral theory containing a rule covering same-patient cases will
also contain a rule covering different-patient cases (and vice versa). For,
it would be strange for a moral theory to require one course of action
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in same-patient cases if it didn’t require a different course of action in
different-patient cases. Thus, we can expect that, in themoral theories that
interest us, patient-relative moral rules will generally come in pairs (cov-
ering same and different patient cases) whereas patient-neutral rules will
not.
With this understanding of patient-relativity in place we can now see
that therearevariouspossiblecombinationsofagent,moment,andpatient-
relativity/neutrality. The cases we have considered so far have only covered
a few of these possible combinations. Table 1 summarizes all eight possi-
ble combinations.17
It should be noted that any rule that combines agent and moment-
relativity with patient-neutrality (i.e., combination 7) will entail a rule that
combines relativity in all three domains (combination 8). For example, the
rule “Never break a promise, no matter the future consequences” entails
the rule “Never break a promise to a patient, no matter the future conse-
quences for that patient” (meaning that the former rule prohibits every-
thing that the latter rule prohibits).
No other entailments hold between the different combinations in
this table. For example, it is not the case that rules that are neutral in
every domain (combination 1) entail rules that are agent- and moment-
17. I thank Philip Pettit for urging me to consider all eight possible combinations
summarized in this table.
TABLE 1
POSSIBLE COMBINATIONS OF AGENT, MOMENT, AND
PATIENT-RELATIVITY/NEUTRALITY
Agent Time Patient Example
1 N N N Minimize general promise breaking
2 N N R Minimize promise breaking to the same patient
3 N R N Minimize present-moment promise breaking
4 N R R Minimize present-moment promise breaking to
the same patient
5 R N N Minimize your promise breaking
6 R N R Minimize your promise breaking to the same patient
7 R R N Never break a promise, no matter the future consequences
8 R R R Never break a promise to a patient, no matter the
future consequences for that patient
NOTE.—N 5 neutral; R 5 relative.
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neutral yet patient-relative (combination 2). One might think that such
an entailment holds, but this is a mistake. For example, one might think
that if you are required to minimize general promise breaking then you
are required to minimize promise breaking to the same patient. How-
ever, this is not the case. In fact, these two rules are contraries. For the
latter rule (combination 2) requires an agent to break a promise to a pa-
tient when that is the only way to bring about more promise keeping to that
patient overall. However, this requirement conﬂicts with the former rule
(combination 1) because there will be cases where breaking a promise will
minimize promise breaking to the promisee and yet cause more promise
breaking overall. In such cases the former rule requires promise keeping
whereas the latter rule requires promise breaking.
C. Applications of Patient-Relativity
Above I motivated patient-relativity by presenting several cases where com-
monsense moral intuitions appear to require moral rules that make refer-
ence to the numerical identity of moral patients. However, we might ask
whether there are moral theories that lend support to patient-relativity
independently of these commonsense intuitions. In this section, I will con-
sider three differentmoral theories that appear to provide a theoretical ba-
sis for patient-relativity. I will then show how patient-relativity provides a
reply to Derek Parﬁt’s “appeal to full relativity” argument.
First, consider the humanity formula of Kant’s categorical imperative:
FH: Always treat people as ends in themselves and never as mere
means.
The humanity formula is a very inﬂuential moral principle, and there
are many different accounts of how to interpret it. On some, but not
all, interpretations of this principle it gives the patient-relative verdict in
the promise-keeping examples considered above. For breaking a prom-
ise now to one promisee to keep several promises in the future to other
promisees might be classiﬁed as treating the present promisee as a “mere
means” to fulﬁlling promises owed to several others. Furthermore, break-
ing a promise now to one promisee to keep several promises in the fu-
ture to that same promisee might be classiﬁed as treating that promisee
as an “end in herself” because it is out of concern for the promisee, qua
rational agent, that the present promise is broken. It might be thought
that this possibility demonstrates that we can account for the promise-
keeping examples without appealing to patient-relative rules. For the hu-
manity formula does not appear, at face value, to be a patient-relative rule
(it makes no reference to the numerical identity of patients). However, I
believe it shows the opposite. For the concepts used in the humanity for-
mula of treating a person as a “mere means,” and as an “end in herself,”
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are imprecise and ambiguous in various ways. Indeed, the principle has
many interpretations because different thinkers have taken these concepts
to mean different things. Thus, when the principle is used in a particu-
lar example to derive a moral verdict we should ask: what interpretation
of these key concepts is required to produce the claimed verdict? Per-
haps there are several possible interpretations of “mere means” and “end
in themselves” that allow the humanity formula to explain the promise-
keeping examples. However, here is one interpretation worth considering:
To treat someone as a “mere means” is to perform an action with the
motive of using that person to serve, or bring about, a goal that is not
that person’s own goal but rather the goal of some numerically dis-
tinct person. To treat someone as an “end in themselves” is to per-
form an action with themotive of using that person to serve, or bring
about, a goal that is that person’s own goal.
On this interpretation, the humanity formula turns out to be a patient-
relative rule as, when fully stated, it makes reference to the numerical
identity of moral patients. Several other obvious ways of interpreting the
imprecise concepts in the humanity formula also produce a rule that is
patient-relative. As such, I suspect that all plausible interpretations of the
formula of humanity that allow it to explain the promise-keeping examples
will be interpretations that make the principle patient-relative. However,
arguing for this claim would be a long and difﬁcult task and I will not at-
tempt it here. Showing that, on some candidate interpretations of the
formula of humanity, it is a kind of patient-relative rule that explains the
promise-keeping examples is itself a signiﬁcant conclusion. Thus, one theo-
retical basis for patient-relativity comes via certain interpretations of Kant’s
humanity principle.
As a second example, consider the moral contractualism of T. M.
Scanlon. According to Scanlon: “An act is wrong if its performance
under the circumstances would be disallowed by any set of principles for
the general regulation of behaviour that no one could reasonably re-
ject.”18 Now, consider again the same-patient promise-keeping example.
In this case there does not appear to be anyone who could reasonably
reject the trade-off that is made on the patient-relative rule. For, there
appears to be no one who can claim that they are being treated unfairly
or unjustly. The patient involved has no reason to reject the trade-off
and, in fact, has reasons to welcome it as she is better off in the long run
by it (e.g., fewer promises owed to her are broken). The agent involved
also has no reason to reject it and also appears to be better off as she
18. Thomas Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 1998), 153.
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minimizes her own wrongdoing. Finally, there appear to be no reasons
for any third party to object to the trade-off being made. This can be
contrasted with the “different-patient” case where some thing owed to
one patient is withheld in order to give several other patients what they
are owed. In this case the patients who beneﬁt in the future, and the
agent who performs the action, may be better off. However, the patient
who loses in the present moment is worse off and can claim that she
has been treatedunfairly.Onthesegrounds it couldbereasonable toreject
a principle that allowed this kind of trade-off. Thus, Scanlon’s con-
tractualism can provide a theoretical grounding for patient-relativity.
As a third example consider the distinction between interpersonal
aggregation and intrapersonal aggregation. Interpersonal aggregation
is aggregation of the good across the lives of different patients. Intra-
personal aggregation is aggregation of the good in the life of a single pa-
tient. Some take this distinction to be morally signiﬁcant.19 They typically
endorse the following principle:
PA: It is morally permissible to harm a patient in order to maximize
that patient’s total welfare. However, it is morally impermissible to
harm a patient in order to maximize the total welfare of other pa-
tients.20
PA is often motivated by appeal to the following considerations. It is nor-
mally rational for us to bear risks or accept certain harms to ourselves
when doing so maximizes our overall welfare. Given this fact, it seems
permissible for others to harm us in these ways in order to maximize our
welfare. Yetmany have the intuition that it is morally impermissible to harm
someone to bring about a greater beneﬁt to others. PA seems to adequately
capture this set of intuitions.
PA is a patient-relative rule because it makes reference to the nu-
merical identity of moral patients. Furthermore, PA entails the patient-
relative verdict in the promise-keeping example. For making the trade-
off in the different-patient case appears to be a form of interpersonal
aggregation and thus is prohibited by PA. On the other hand, making
the trade-off in the same-patient case appears to be a form of intraper-
sonal aggregation and thus is permitted by PA.However, although PA can
19. See Nagel, The Possibility of Altruism, 138; Scanlon,What We Owe Each Other, 229–40;
and J. Paul Kelleher, “Relevance and Non-consequentialist Aggregation,” Utilitas 26 (2014):
386–408, 404–5. Nagel appeals to the separateness of persons to explain the moral signiﬁ-
cance of the distinction between intrapersonal and interpersonal aggregation.
20. Those who endorse this principle may qualify it in various ways. For example, they
may agree that, above a certain threshold, harming in order to interpersonally aggregate is
morally permitted. However, such a threshold is only applied to interpersonal aggregation;
intrapersonal aggregation is taken to be permissible simpliciter.
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explain patient-relativity in the promise-keeping case, it cannot explain
all candidate cases of patient-relativity. For some moral rules that are un-
related to the aggregation of welfare can also be classed as patient-relative
or patient-neutral. As an example, consider a rule that says the guilty ought
to be punished. What does such a rule require in a case where the only
options are: (i) punish one guilty person now, which will allow several
people guilty of comparable crimes to escapepunishment later; (ii) let one
guilty person escape punishment now, which will ensure that several peo-
ple guilty of comparable crimes get punished later? What about a case
where the trade-off is between letting a guilty person get punished for one
crime now but escape punishment for several comparable crimes later, or
letting that person escape punishment for a crime now to ensure that she
is punished for several later crimes? Some will endorse a rule that requires
the trade-off in both kinds of cases because they believe wemust maximize
the punishment of the guilty. Such a rule is patient-neutral. Others will
endorse a rule that prohibits the trade-off when there are different guilty
patients but requires the trade-off with respect to the same guilty patient.
Such a rule is patient-relative. Yet, on several prominent theories of re-
tributive punishment, neither of these rules concerns the aggregation of
patient welfare. Therefore, we might endorse patient-relativity in certain
cases that cannot be explained by the principle PA.
It is also worth considering more generally how the distinction be-
tween interpersonal and intrapersonal aggregation relates to the patient-
relative/patient-neutral distinction. Any moral rule concerned with inter-
personal or intrapersonal aggregation will be a patient-relative rule as it
will make reference to the numerical identity of moral patients. By con-
trast, anymoral rule concerned only with aggregation simpliciter will be a
patient-neutral rule as it will not make reference to the numerical iden-
tity of moral patients. An example of the former kind of rule is PA above.
An example of the latter kind of rule is the aggregation rule endorsed by
classical utilitarianism:
UA: The morally right action is that which maximizes total net wel-
fare.
UA is an aggregation rule, yet in contrast to PA it is a patient-neutral rule
as it makes no reference to the numerical identity of moral patients. It
might be tempting to conclude from these observations that the patient-
neutral/patient-relative distinction is equivalent to the distinction be-
tween moral rules that concern aggregation simpliciter and moral rules
that concern interpersonal or intrapersonal aggregation. However, this
is not the case, as moral rules that do not require any form of aggrega-
tion can also be classed as patient-relative or patient-neutral. For exam-
ple, some deontologists advocate the “Equal greatest chance principle”
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in rescue cases involving interpersonal trade-offs.21 They argue that if we
ﬁnd ourselves having to choose between saving the life of one stranger
and saving the life of ﬁve strangers, and other than numbers all else is
equal, then the morally correct thing to do is not to favor the larger
number. Instead, we must give all strangers the greatest possible chance
of being saved consistent with every stranger having an equal chance of
being saved. In the case described we might do this by ﬂipping a coin to
decidewhether to save the one or save the ﬁve, thereby giving each stranger
a one in two chance of being saved. Deontologists who endorse this prin-
ciple in rescue cases might also apply it to trade-offs involving promise
breaking as follows:
EGC: When there are comparable promises owed by one promisor
to different promisees, the promisor must give each promisee the
greatest possible chance of having her promises honored, consistent
with every promisee having an equal chance of having her promises
honored.22
EGC is a patient-relative rule because it makes reference to the numerical
identity of moral patients. However, it is not a rule concerned with either
interpersonal or intrapersonal aggregation. Thus, although all rules re-
quiring interpersonal or intrapersonal aggregation are patient-relative,
some patient-relative rules do not require either kind of aggregation.
Therefore, the patient-relative/patient-neutral distinction is broader and
more fundamental than the distinction between rules that require aggre-
gation simpliciter and rules that require interpersonal or intrapersonal
aggregation.
Finally, I will examine how recognizing patient-relativity can pro-
vide a response to Derek Parﬁt’s “appeal to full relativity” argument. In
chapter 9 of Reasons and Persons, Parﬁt develops an argument against
rational egoism he calls “the appeal to full relativity.” As we saw above
in Section II, there are four possible ways a rule can combine agent and
moment-neutrality/relativity. Two of these four possibilities combine rel-
ativity in one domain with neutrality in another domain. Parﬁt describes
such rules as “incompletely relative.” The other two possibilities were
eitherneutral inbothdomainsorrelative inbothdomains.Parﬁtdescribes
these respectively as “fully neutral” and “fully relative.” According to Parﬁt,
we should reject on theoretical grounds rules that are incompletely rela-
tive, and thus only accept rules that are fully neutral or fully relative. Parﬁt
21. For example, see John Taurek, “Should the Numbers Count?” Philosophy and Pub-
lic Affairs 6 (1977): 293–316.
22. EGC would typically be combined with a rule requiring promisors to minimize
their promise breaking with respect to comparable promises owed to the same promisee.
24 Ethics October 2016
claims this because he thinks there is an important analogy between “I”
and “now”:
This claim can appeal to the analogy between oneself and the pres-
ent, or what is referred to by the words ‘I’ and ‘now’. This analogy
holds only at a formal level. Particular times do not resemble par-
ticular people. But theword ‘I’ refers to aparticular person in the same
way in which the word ‘now’ refers to a particular time. And when
each of us is deciding what to do, he is asking, ‘What should I do
now?’ Given the analogy between ‘I’ and ‘now’, a theory ought to give
to both the same treatment.23
Parﬁt directs the appeal to full relativity against the theory of rational
egoism. However, he notes that this appeal is intended to apply to all nor-
mative theories and thus can be used to defeat any incompletely relative
theory.24 This has led some to argue that there are only two plausible
kinds of moral theories, those that are agent- and moment-neutral and
those that are agent- andmoment-relative.25However, themost promising
cases of patient-relativity appear to challenge this. For example, take the
promise-breaking case discussed in part A. In this case we saw that there
are strong intuitive and theoretical grounds for thinking that an agent-
relative constraint on promise breaking must be moment-neutral with re-
spect to the same patient. However, anymoral rule that secured this result
would be incompletely relative because it would combine agent-relativity
with moment-neutrality. Thus, the intuitive and theoretical grounds in
favor of this kind of patient-relativity are in conﬂict with Parﬁt’s theoreti-
cal considerations against incompletely relative rules. Given that the con-
siderations in favor of patient-relativity appear strong and Parﬁt’s analogy
argument appears weak, we should accept the possibility of incompletely
relative moral theories. Importantly, once we accept an incompletely rel-
ative theory in any part of our normative theorizing, we no longer have
grounds for rejecting other theories for their incomplete relativity. Thus,
recognizing that there are strong arguments for patient-relativity not only
demonstrates that there can be incompletely relative moral theories, it
also undermines Parﬁt’s use of the appeal to full relativity against rational
egoism.
IV. CONCLUSION
In this article, I have presented a new kind of moral relativity that stands
alongside agent-relativity and moment-relativity. All moral rules can be
23. Parﬁt, Reasons and Persons, 140.
24. Ibid., 148.
25. Louise, “Relativity of Value,” 535.
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classiﬁed as either agent-relative or agent-neutral. They can also be clas-
siﬁed as either moment-relative or moment-neutral. This article shows
that there is a third type of classiﬁcation that needs to be added to this
list. Amoral rule can also be classiﬁed as either patient-relative or patient-
neutral. Being aware of this third kind of relativity improves our under-
standing of the main structural features of moral theories. It also allows
us to better understand how agent-relativity and moment-relativity in-
teract. Finally, it appears to give us plausible examples of normative the-
ories that are incompletely relative and thus provides us with a response
to Derek Parﬁt’s “appeal to full relativity” argument.
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